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The Declining Information Content of Dividend Announcements 
and the Effect of Institutional Holdings 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We propose an explanation for the “disappearing dividend” phenomenon: the decline in 
the information content of dividend announcements. It reduces the propensity of firms to 
pay or increase dividends, since dividends are costly.  A reason for the decline in the 
information content of dividends is the rise in holdings by institutional investors that are 
more sophisticated and informed.  We indeed find a decline in CAR at dividend change 
announcements since the mid 1970s.  Across firms, CAR declines in institutional 
holdings.  Exploiting their superior information, institutional investors buy before 
dividend increases and sell afterwards. And, dividends are less likely to rise in firms with 
high institutional holdings. 
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1. Introduction 
 Fama and French (2001) present the phenomenon of the “disappearing dividend” 
by which, since 1978, the propensity of public companies to pay dividends has declined. 
They show that companies are continuously less likely to pay dividends, after controlling 
for their changing characteristics.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) document a decline in 
both the dividend payout ratio and in the dividend yield.  And, Allen and Michaely 
(2003) document that the number of firms that announce dividend increases has declined 
since 1978.  
We propose that a possible reason for the disappearing dividend is the decline in 
the information content of dividend announcements.  Stock price are known to react 
positively to dividend changes announced by firms (see Aharony and Swary, 1980 and a 
survey in Allen and Michaely, 2003).  The use of dividends as a means of signaling 
entails costs: shortfall in resources that requires raising of capital, which is costly 
(Bhattacharya, 1979, Ofer and Thakor, 1987), higher tax (John and Williams, 1985) and 
suboptimal investment (Miller and Rock, 1985).   In general, the cost is necessary to 
produce signaling equilibrium.  The positive reaction of stock prices to announcements of 
dividend increases, in spite of their higher cost, reflects the positive information about the 
firm value that these announcements convey. Indeed, Ofer and Siegel (1987) show that 
following announcements of dividend changes, analysts update their expectations on the 
firm’s future earnings.1 
Testing our proposition, we find the following: 
                                                 
1 Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) present evidence showing that the stock price reaction to dividend 
change announcements reflects information and not wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders. 
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a. There is a decline since the mid-1970s in the absolute value of the cumulative 
abnormal return, CAR, at the announcement of dividend changes. There is a 
decline toward zero in the CAR for dividend increases, which is positive, and the 
negative CAR for dividend decreases rises toward zero. This pattern is consistent 
with the decline in the propensity of firms to pay dividends or increase dividends, 
which peaks in the 1970s and has declined ever since then. 
b. The dividend response coefficient – the sensitivity of CAR to the magnitude of the 
dividend change – declines over time for both dividend increases and decreases. 
c. Return volatility immediately before dividend change announcements, which 
partly reflects information asymmetry, declines over time (controlling for the 
stocks’ normal, long-term volatility). 
Our evidence suggests that dividend news convey less information about firm 
values now as compared to the past.  Since dividend signaling is costly, firms have 
become less willing to use dividends as means to convey information. This explains the 
“disappearing dividend” phenomenon.   
 The declining information content of dividends is partly due to the increasing 
availability of information about public companies.  There has been a continuous 
expansion of investment newsletters and analysts reports that provide information and 
analysis about public companies, and more financial information is provided by the news 
media.  For example, Financial News Network (FNN) started broadcasting in 1981, 
providing costless continuous update on business news and on stock prices in the major 
exchanges to TV households nationwide via satellite or cable.  It was acquired in 1991 by 
Consumer News & Business Channel (CNBC), which in 1989 started broadcasting 
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similar information via cable.  More information about companies reduces the asymmetry 
of information about their values and makes signaling through dividends less valuable. 
We propose an additional explanation for the declining information content of 
dividend announcements: the increased involvement in the market of institutional 
investors, which are considered more sophisticated and informed than retail investors.  It 
is well known that institutional stockholdings increased over time (we provide below 
information about it).   We examine the cross-firms effects of institutional holdings, 
denoted INST, and find the following.2  
a. Across stocks, the price response to dividend increase announcements, CAR, is 
significantly lower in firms with higher INST.   
b. The dividend response coefficient is declining significantly as a function of INST. 
c. The volatility of stock returns immediately before dividend increase 
announcements is lower in firms with higher INST (controlling for the firms’ 
normal, long-term volatility). 
d. Institutions increase their holdings in stocks that subsequently raise dividends and 
divest after the dividend information is released.  INST rises significantly in the 
two quarters before dividend increase announcements and declines significantly 
by the end of the quarter of the announcement and in the quarter that follows, as a 
function of the institutional holding of the stock. 
e. Firms with high institutional holdings are less likely to raise dividends: the 
likelihood of a dividend announcement being an increase is a declining function 
of the firm’s INST. 
                                                 
2 These tests are conducted only for dividend increase announcements because of the paucity of cases of 
dividend decrease announcements that also have data on INST. 
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These evidence support in a number of ways our hypothesis that the institutional 
ownership reduced the information content of dividend increase announcements, which 
in turn made signaling by dividends less valuable and led to the disappearance of 
dividends. 
 Another explanation for the disappearance of dividends is offered by Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2002) “catering theory of dividend.”  Dividend payment by firms responds to 
investor demand for dividends proxied by the dividend premium, the difference between 
the market-to-book ratios of dividend payers and non-payers in a given year. Their 
evidence is consistent with this theory and inconsistent with other explanations.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the evidence on the 
decline in the information content of dividend announcements over time. In Section 3, we 
relate the information effect of dividend and firms’ propensity to raise dividends to the 
level of institutional ownership. We summarize the results in Section 4 and offer some 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Stock price reaction over time to dividend announcements 
 
Dividend surprises are known to affect stock prices.  The evidence shows that 
stock abnormal returns at the announcements of dividend changes are positively 
correlated with these changes (Aharony and Swary, 1980).   The signaling theory 
suggests that this effect of dividend change announcements on stock prices reflects 
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information about future firm value. In this section, we estimate the stock price reaction 
to dividend change announcements and present evidence that it declines over time. 
 
2.1 Sample selection 
The sample is drawn from all dividend announcements in the CRSP daily file for 
NYSE\AMEX stocks, starting in July 1962.  The selection criteria satisfy the following:  
1. The firm is not in the financial service sector (SIC code from 6000 – 6999) or in the 
public service (utility) sector (4900-4999). 
2. The shares on which the dividends are paid are ordinary common shares of U.S.-
incorporated companies. Excluded are closed-end funds, REITs, stock certificates 
and ADRs. 
3. The distribution is a regular quarterly cash dividend paid in U.S. dollars 
(distribution code 1232).  Excluded are dividends defined as special, year-end, 
interim or non-recurring and dividends paid at other frequencies or in foreign 
currency. Also excluded are dividend initiations and resumptions.  
4. The dividend announcement must have a valid announcement date. 
5. There is no announcement of other distributions in a 30-day window (days -15 to 15 
day surrounding the announcement).3  
6. Excluded are dividend changes that (a) result from mergers or acquisitions, stock 
splits, and other events that adjust prices, and (b) are smaller than 0.5% of the 
previous dividend, in order to avoid dividend changes that may be recorded due to 
rounding errors. 
                                                 
3 This follows Christensen and Prabhala (1995). 
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Criteria 1- 5 result in 175,658 dividend announcement events. We focus in this 
study on announcements of dividend changes, whose number is much smaller. Given 
data availability and satisfying criterion 6, we obtain 16,189 events of dividend 
changes: 14,911 dividend increases and 1,278 dividend decreases. 
To test the time trend of the information content of dividend announcements, we 
partition the sample over time in two ways: three equal subperiods of thirteen years 
each and eight subperiods of five years each (except for the first period, 1962-1965).  
In the figures, we present year-by-year results over the entire sample period.  
 
2.2 Data Definition 
The variables for each event of dividend change are constructed as follows.   
1. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return obtained by summing the abnormal 
returns over 2 days, days 0 and +1 (day 0 is the dividend announcement day). The 
abnormal return for each day is the stock return minus the return on the size-based 
portfolio of the decile of stocks to which the stock belongs.4  The abnormal return 
is obtained from the daily CRSP file. We also consider CAR13, the cumulative 
abnormal returns over days -11 to +1 (including the announcement day).  
2. DDIVY, the change in dividend yield. DDIVY =4⋅[DIVAMTof current quarter –
DIVAMT of previous quarter]/P. DIVAMT is the dollar quarterly dividend per 
share (adjusted for stock dividends and splits by the CRSP price-adjusting factor). 
P is the price at the end of the month that precedes the month when the dividend 
is announced. We eliminate cases where |DDIVY| > 0.20  (for example, an 
                                                 
4 We replicate the analysis using abnormal returns relative to CRSP beta-based portfolio. The results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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increase in the dividend yield from 1% to 21%), which eliminates 6 cases (out of 
15,865). 
3. LTYLD, the long-term dividend yield, is the sum of DIVAMT paid over a 
12-month period ending in the month prior to the month of the dividend 
announcement, divided by the average stock price during the 3-month period 
immediately prior to the beginning of the 12-month period (using end-of-month 
prices).  This ratio is then deflated by 1+return on the S&P 500 index for the same 
12-month period to adjust for market-wide stock price movements.  (This follows 
the procedure suggested in Christensen and Prabhala (1995).) 
4. SIZEN is the firm’s stock value (in logarithm) as of the last month prior to the 
month of the dividend announcement, normalized by the S&P 500 index where 
the base is the value of the S&P 500 index at the beginning of the study period 
(July 1962). 
5. VOLDIV, the dividend-related volatility before the announcement, is the standard 
deviation (in logarithm) of the daily excess returns over 20 days, day -21 to -2 
(day 0 is the dividend announcement day).  
6. LTVOL, the long-term return volatility before the dividend announcement, is the 
standard deviation (in logarithm) of monthly excess returns over months -24 to -1.  
 
2.3 Stock price reaction to dividend changes over time 
We examine whether there is a trend over time in the stock price reaction to 
dividend change announcements, measured by CAR.  Table 1 documents the values of 
CAR over the sample period for both dividend increases and dividend decreases.  
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Consistent with earlier studies, the mean CAR is positive, +0.87%, and highly significant 
for dividend increases and negative, –4.58%, and highly significant for dividend 
decreases.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
 The new results here are the decline over time in CAR. In each 13-year subperiod, 
the (absolute) mean CAR is smaller than in the previous subperiod.  The decline in the 
(absolute) mean CAR is statistically significant, as indicated by the t-statistic Tdif, which 
tests the difference between the mean CAR in one subperiod and the mean CAR in the 
preceding subperiod.  For dividend increases, CAR declines over the three subperiods 
from 1.17% to 0.94% to 0.44%.  For dividend decreases, CAR rises from –6.43% to 
−4.29% to –2.63%.  In both dividend increases and decreases, the pattern of the median 
CAR is similar to that of the mean CAR. 
Table 1 also presents a finer partition of the sample period into 8 subperiods.  For 
dividend increases, CAR peaks in the period 1971-1975 and declines thereafter, although 
the decline is not monotonic.  The significant decline occurs during the three five-year 
subperiods between 1976 and 1990. For dividend decreases, mean CAR increases after 
1966. The median CAR shows the same pattern as that of the mean CAR. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
The pattern of decline over time in the (absolute) CAR is shown in Figure 1.  We 
plot CARy, the mean CAR in year y, over the years 1962 to 2000, and depict the trend by a 
five-year moving average.  The trend shows a decline in (absolute) CARy over the years 
after peaking in the mid-1970s. To test the time trend of CARy, we estimate the following 
models where CARy is a function of y, y = 1962, 1963, …., 2000. We also control for the 
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average monthly market return (value-weighted) in year y, RMy, since dividend increases 
may constitute a greater surprise in years when the market performs poorly than in years 
when it is doing well.5  By this reasoning, CARy should be negatively (positively) related 
to RMy for dividend increases (decreases). The following are the results that we obtain. 
(a) For dividend increases: 
CARy = 0.39 – 0.0002⋅y – 0.089⋅RMy      (1.1) 
(t =) (4.30) (4.21)       (2.79)  R2 = 0.43 
(b) For dividend decreases: 
CARy = -2.58 + 0.0013⋅y + 0.096⋅RMy     (1.2) 
(t =) (6.64) (6.52)         (0.35)  R2 = 0.51 
The results6 show a significant decline over the years in the (absolute) stock price 
reaction to dividend change announcements.  Also, the effect of RMy for dividend 
increases is negative, as expected, and significant. 
The pattern over time of CARy in Figure 1 resembles the depiction of the 
disappearing dividends phenomenon in Fama and French (2001, Figure 5). They show 
that the percent of firms paying dividends in the NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq rises 
between 1970 and 1978 and declines thereafter.  Allen and Michaely (2003) show a 
similar pattern over time for the number of companies that announce dividend increases, 
with the decline being the greatest during the 1980s.  Baker and Wurgler (2002) also 
show a turning point in firms’ propensity to pay dividends after 1978.  The similarity 
between these patterns of the propensity to pay dividend and our documented pattern of 
                                                 
5 There may also be a behavioral explanation for the negative coefficient of RMy. Dividends become more 
desirable when the market performs poorly since then investors feel that they earn income on their stocks 
while waiting for the market to appreciate. When the market is doing well, investors’ focus is on capital 
gains and they care less about changes in dividend yield, which is usually very small compared with capital 
gains. 
6 The standard errors are estimated using the Newy-West (1987) method with MA=3. 
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CARy suggests that dividend decisions made by firms are positively correlated over time 
with the (absolute) stock price reaction to dividend changes.  If a dividend increase 
announcements generate smaller price increases and dividend decrease announcements 
are less harmful to the stock prices, firms may reduce their propensity to pay dividend if 
dividend is costly. 
 Next, we examine the mean abnormal return over longer periods around the 
dividend announcement day by considering CAR10 and CAR13, the cumulative abnormal 
return over days –11 to –2 and –11 to +1, respectively.  The results in Table 2 for CAR13 
that includes the event day are similar to those observed in Table 1 for both dividend 
increases and dividend decreases.  Interestingly, the mean CAR10 has the same sign as 
CAR and is statistically significant, implying that stock prices move ahead of the formal 
dividend announcement in anticipation of the news. The results in Table 2 thus further 
support our proposition that the information content of dividend announcements declines 
over time. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
    
2.4 Price reaction to the magnitude of dividend changes 
 The information content of the magnitude of dividend changes is measured by the 
dividend response coefficient, α1, in the following model.  
 CARj = α0 + α1DDIVYj + α2SIZENj + α3LTYLDj + ej .     (2) 
We expect that α1 > 0 if the magnitude of the dividend change, DDIVYj, is informative.  
The two other variables are included as controls.  The coefficient of SIZENj should be 
negative, since large firms usually receive more attention by analysts and investors, 
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which reduces the incremental information about the firm provided by the dividend 
change. The coefficient of LTYLDj should be positive because dividends are more 
informative of value in high dividend-paying firms which have lower growth prospects, 
and because the surprise of dividend increase in such firms is greater (see Christensen 
and Prabhala, 1995).  We index by j the dividend change events and the variables are 
measured as they are known at the time of the event. 
If the information content of the magnitude of dividend changes is declining, we 
should observe that the dividend response coefficient α1 declines over time.  To estimate 
the changes in α1 over time we modify model (2) as follows: 
CARj = α0 +∑
=
S
s 1
α0sDUMs  +∑
=
S
s 1
α1sDUMs⋅DDIVYj  + α1DDIVYj 
+ α2SIZENj + α3LTYLDj + ej  .    (3) 
DUMs equals 1 in period s and zero otherwise, where s is an index of the time period. We 
again present two sets of results that correspond to two breakdowns of the sample period.  
First we examine three subperiods of 13 years each, 1962-1974, 1975-1987, 1988-2000, 
in which case S = 2.  The second breakdown is into 8 subperiods of 5 years each (the first 
is of four years): 1962-1965, 1966-1970, … 1996-2000; then, S = 7.   
In model (3), α1s measures the difference between the effect of DDIVYj on CARj 
in subperiod s and the effect in the last subperiod, estimated by α1.  For example, the 
dividend response coefficient in subperiod s = 1 is α11 + α1. Then, the t-statistic of α1s 
tests whether the dividend response coefficient in subperiod 1, α11 + α1, is greater than 
the dividend response coefficient α1 in the most recent subperiod. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 
The hypothesis tested by model (3) is that the news on the magnitude of dividend 
changes becomes less informative over time.  That is, the dividend response coefficients 
α1s should be positive and declining in s.  The results in Table 3 support this hypothesis. 
The coefficients α1s in both models (for S = 2 and S = 7) are all positive, meaning that α1 
is larger in earlier subperiods than it is in the last subperiod.  In Panel A for dividend 
increases, the coefficients α11 and α12 are both positive and highly significant.  They are 
approximately the same magnitude, meaning that the decline in the dividend response 
coefficient occurs in the last subperiod:  it declines from 0.165 (= 0.89+0.76) to 0.76.  For 
dividend decreases, the coefficients α1s are positive and decline over the two subperiods, 
as expected.  Panel B presents estimations for shorter subperiods.  For dividend increases, 
the coefficients α1s generally decline over time, although not monotonically. The pattern 
is similar for dividend decreases.7 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 Next, we estimate model (2) every year and obtain α1y, the year-y estimate of the 
coefficient α1 (y = 1963, 1964, ..., 2000).8  These coefficients are depicted in Figure 2.  
The annual model is estimated only for dividend increases, since in some years there are 
too few dividend decrease announcements.  Figure 2 shows a decline in the five-year 
moving average of α1y since the early 1980s.  The following is a regression of α1y on a 
time trend, y: 
                                                 
7 We also estimated model (3) replacing DDIVYj by a variable that estimates the dividend surprise from a 
Probit model of dividend changes as a function of some explanatory variable, as suggested by Prabhala 
(1997). The results are qualitatively the same as those reported for DDIVYj. In particular, the coefficient 
α1s, which measures the effect of dividend surprise on CAR, declines over time. 
8 Year 1962 is deleted because of very few observations. CRSP daily files started in the middle of that year. 
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 α1y =   78.02  –  0.039⋅y  + 11.85⋅RMy 
 (t =) (4.49)     (4.42)        (1.52)    R2 = 0.35  (4.1) 
The coefficient of y is negative and significant, as expected, after controlling for the 
market return whose effect is insignificant.9  The effect of RMy is insignificant. The 
results thus show a declining trend in the sensitivity of stock price reaction to the 
magnitude of dividend increases. 
 One cost of the use of dividend signaling is the higher income tax on dividends 
relative to the tax on capital gains. Bernheim and Wantz (1995) propose that α1y, which 
they call “the bang-for-the-buck,” should rise with the dividend tax rate. We examine this 
by regressing α1y on TAXy, the tax advantage of dividends relative to capital gains, which 
is similar to the variable used in Bernheim and Wantz (1995) but with an opposite sign.10 
Consistent with Bernheim and Wantz (1995), the slope coefficient in a regression of α1y 
on TAXy (and an intercept) is negative, −2.99, and highly significant, t = 4.30.  However, 
when y is added to the model the effect of TAXy becomes statistically insignificant.  Also, 
Baker and Wurgler (2003) find that while, by Bernheim and Wantz, the propensity to pay 
dividend is positively related to the tax advantage of dividends, empirically this 
relationship is negative over time.  
 We further examine the effects on the dividend response coefficient of variables 
that reflect information in the market and the cost of signaling by dividends.  The bid-ask 
spread on stocks (the difference between the bid price to buy and the offer price to sell) is 
shown by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) to reflect the extent of asymmetry of information 
                                                 
9 The standard errors are estimated using the Newy-West (1987) method with MA=3. 
10 Specifically, TAX equals the ratio of one minus the weighted average income tax rate to one minus the 
weighted average capital gain tax rate.  The weighted tax rates are obtained from the NBER Taxim web 
site, calculated by Daniel Feenberg. Data are available from 1960 to 1999.  For 1963 and 1965, when data 
are missing, we use interpolations; the values in the years that straddle the missing years are very close. 
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about the stock.  We use the average bid-ask spread on the stocks that constitute the Dow 
Jones Average, SPREADy, which Jones (2003) shows to have been declining since 1974.  
By our hypothesis on the declining information content of dividends, α1y should be 
positively related to SPREADy.  
Signaling with dividends is costly because of the greater need for external 
financing to cover a cash shortfall when the firm increases its dividend. Bhattacharya 
(1979) and Ofer and Thakor (1987) suggest that external financing is costly because of 
capital market friction, which raises the firm’s borrowing rate.  We use as a proxy for the 
change in the cost of external financing the change in the interest spread between BAA 
and AAA corporate bonds:11 DINTy = (BAA-AAA)y – (BAA-AAA)y-1.   By our hypothesis, 
when external financing measured by DINTy becomes costlier, α1y is higher.  
Finally, we control for the market volatility, RMSDy, the standard deviation of the 
daily market return (value-weighted) in year y, which is a measure of both noise and 
information arriving to the market during this period.  The greater the market volatility, 
the weaker the information signal provided by the dividend change, and therefore the 
lower is the dividend response coefficient, α1. We therefore re-estimate model (4.1) as 
follows: 
We obtain the following results: 
 α1y =   32.27 – 0.016⋅y + 1.42⋅SPREADy + 1.06⋅DINTy – 76.23⋅RMSDy 
(t =)   (1.33)   (1.30)      (2.04)                  (1.82)         (3.80)   
        R2 = 0.42   (4.2) 
                                                 
11 For each year, we average the monthly rates, provided by Global Insights. The series DINTy is serially 
uncorrelated. 
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All the coefficients have the predicted signs, although now the coefficient of the time 
trend y is insignificant.  Notably, the secular decline in SPREADy since 1974 is naturally 
correlated with y, which becomes insignificant.  (The coefficient of RMy is insignificant.)  
The positive effect of SPREADy, which declines over time, is thus consistent with the 
decline in the information content of dividend over time.12  When SPREADy is dropped, 
the coefficient y becomes significant. 
 We also use another method of examining the information content of the 
magnitude of dividend changes over time.  Let ACARq and ADDIVYq be, respectively, the 
average CAR and DDIVY for all dividend increase announcements in quarter q, q = 1, 2, 
3, … 152 for the 38 years of data that we analyze. We analyze quarterly data, hence we 
confine our analysis to dividend increases since in some quarters there are only a few 
observations of dividend decreases. Also, RMq is the quarterly market return (value 
weighted).  We then estimate the following model: 
ACARq = 0.0040 + 1.36⋅ADDIVYq – 0.0071⋅q⋅ADDIVYq – 0.0071⋅RMq    
  (4.86)  (8.80)      (2.83)      (1.98)  
R2 = 0.35 (5) 
The results show that the average CAR in each quarter q is positively related to the 
average dividend increase in that quarter. However, the positive CAR-ADDIVY 
relationship weakens significantly over time, being much smaller for the more recent 
period. 
 
                                                 
12 We re-estimate the model without the variables y and DINTy and adding TAXy. The coefficient of TAXy is 
–1.63 with t = 1.79. The coefficients of SPREADy and RMSDy retain their signs and are highly significant 
(their t statistics are 2.76 and 3.95, respectively). The R2 of this model is 0.35. 
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2.5 Return volatility before dividend announcements 
Dividend changes are events with information flow that affects the volatility of 
stock return.  Kalay and Lowenstein (1985) find a rise in volatility during the time of 
dividend announcements, which reflects public information.  It is reasonable to assume 
that the volatility just before the dividend announcement reflects private information 
released by informed traders.  If the information content of dividends announcements 
declines over time, there should also be a decline in the dividend-related volatility.  
We examine whether there is a decline over time in the effect of DDIVYj on 
VOLDIVj, the return volatility 20 days before the dividend announcement, days -21 to –2, 
controlling for the stock long-term (two-year) volatility LTVOLj (both volatility measures 
are in logarithm). The model is: 
VOLDIVj = α0 +∑
=
S
s 1
α0sDUMs  +∑
=
S
s 1
α1sDUMs⋅DDIVYj  + α1DDIVYj 
+ α2LTVOL j + ej  .      (6) 
If larger changes in dividend signify more new information, the return volatility before 
the dividend announcement should be an increasing function of the (absolute) dividend 
change.  This implies that for DDIVYj > 0, we expect α1 > 0 and for DDIVYj < 0, we 
expect that α1 < 0.  Of course, we expect that α2 > 0 (controlling for long-term volatility). 
Our hypothesis on the decline in the information content of dividends implies the 
following hypotheses. For dividend increases, α1s > 0 and it declines over time. For 
dividend decreases, α1s < 0 and it rises over time.  
INSERT TABLE 4 
The results in Table 4 for the three subperiod breakdown are consistent with our 
hypothesis.  In the last 13-year period, the magnitude of dividend increases has no effect 
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on volatility: α1 is practically zero.  In earlier periods, the response of volatility to 
dividend increases is greater: both α11 and α12 are significantly positive. Also, α11 > α12 > 
0, implying a decline over time in the effect of dividend increase announcements.  For 
dividend decreases, the results are again consistent with our hypothesis: α1 < 0 and in 
addition α11 < α12 < 0.  
If return volatility is a measure of asymmetric information and arrival of new 
information to the market before the formal announcement of dividend changes, our 
results show that the extent of this information is significantly lower recently compared 
to the past.  That is, the information content of dividend news declines over time. The 
question is why it is so. The next section offers an explanation. 
 
 
3. Institutional investors and price reaction to dividend announcements 
 
 One reason for the decline in the reaction of stock prices to dividend 
announcements may be the increased involvement of institutional investors, who are 
more informed and can trade on their information.   The extent of trading by these 
investors can affect stock prices so that by the time the information is publicly revealed, it 
is already reflected in stock prices. Institutional investors are considered more informed 
since they expend more resources on collecting and processing information about 
companies.13  They are motivated to do that since they hold much larger blocks of stock 
than retail investors do, thus a given amount of information can produce greater benefit 
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by applying to a greater size investment.  Institutional investors enjoy economies of scale 
and professional expertise that give them lower marginal costs in acquiring information. 
And they can expend more resources on obtaining and analyzing corporate information 
than small individual investors can.  Indeed, evidence shows that institutional investors’ 
trades reflect more information relative to all trades in the market (Chakravarty, 2001) 
and stocks with high institutional holdings have greater information-based trading 
(Dennis and Weston, 2001).  
Institutional investors can trade on their information before it is conveyed to 
investors. Indeed, Jiambalvo et al (2002) find that in firms with higher institutional 
holdings, stock prices better reflect information about future earnings.  This relationship 
may be endogenous if institutions prefer to invest in stocks with better disclosure, in 
which case the stock prices also will reflect more information about the firm. Indeed, 
Healy et al (1999) find that firms that expand their disclosure attract additional 
institutional holdings.14  This implies, in our case, a diminishing role of dividends as a 
means of conveying information about the value of firms with high institutional holdings.  
Another effect of institutional investors is that some of them engage in active 
monitoring of the management or can potentially do so (Gillan and Starks, 2001).  
Easterbrook (1984) proposes that dividends enable better monitoring of management by 
reducing the firm’s free cash flow, which is one reason why stockholders welcome 
increases in dividend.  If monitoring by large institutional investors can substitute for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
13  See, for example, Jennings, Schnatterly and Seguin (1997), Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinski (2000), 
Bushee and Noe (2000), Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, Venkatachalam (2002). 
14 Chidambaran and John (2001) show that the presence of large shareholder monitoring is positively 
associated with managerial compensation contracts that provide incentives for greater voluntary disclosure 
of information. 
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monitoring role of dividends, the value of dividends is diminished in firms with large 
institutional holdings.  
 Over the last decades, institutional investors began to hold an increasingly larger 
share of the equity of public companies in the U.S. (see Gompers and Metrick, 2001).  
We propose that this increase in institutional holdings may explain in part the declining 
reaction of stock prices to dividend change announcements, which is documented in 
Section 2. However, the fact that over time institutional holdings rises while the price 
reaction to dividends declines is insufficient to establish a causal relationship.   
We therefore do a cross-section analysis of the effects of institutional holdings on 
stock price reaction to dividend announcements. We test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the institutional ownership, the smaller the reaction of stock 
prices to dividend news. 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional investors increase their holdings in companies with positive 
dividend news well before the announcement, and reduce or do not change their holdings 
after the announcement.  
Hypothesis 3: Firms with greater institutional holdings are less likely to raise dividends.  
 There is evidence that institutional ownership is negatively related to the 
information content of both dividends and earnings announcements.  Alangar, Bathala 
and Rao (1999) find for a sample of extreme changes in dividends that the absolute 
abnormal stock return on the announcement day is negatively related to institutional 
ownership.  Our study tests the effects of institutional holdings on the stock price 
response to dividend announcements using two measures: stock value change, measured 
by cumulative abnormal return (not its absolute value), and the return volatility 
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immediately before the dividend announcement.  Bartov et al (2000) find that abnormal 
stock returns at earnings announcements are negatively related to institutional ownership. 
One of our models produces similar results with respect to dividends. 
 
3.1 Data and variable definitions 
 Our data on institutional holdings of stocks are based on the reports in Form 13F 
to the SEC.  A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires all 
institutions with more than $100 million of securities under discretionary management to 
report their holdings to the SEC.  Holdings are reported quarterly on the SEC’s Form 
13F.  All common stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $300,000 must be 
disclosed. Our data source is CDA/Spectrum (as provided by Thomson Financial), based 
on the Disclosure Database.15  Throughout our paper, “institution” means “institution that 
files a 13F.”   Institutional investors include banks, insurance companies, investment 
companies (mutual funds), investment advisors,16 pension funds and university 
endowment funds.  Our data are the quarterly reports on institutional holdings from the 
second quarter of 1980 through the third quarter of 1998 excluding three quarters, 
4Q1993, 1Q1994 and 2Q1994, for which data are missing.  In sum, our data on 
institutional holdings include 71 quarters. 
 To be included in the sample, a dividend change announcement must satisfy the 
conditions specified in section 2.1 above and must have valid institutional holding data 
for the company that makes the announcement.  These criteria result in a sample of 5,358 
                                                 
15 In a comparative study of the reliability of ownership data from several databases, Anderson and Lee 
(1996) conclude that the ownership data on Disclosure Database ranks above its peers. 
16 Includes investment managers (usually in brokerage firms) holding less than 50% of their assets in 
mutual funds. See Gompers and Metrick (2001) for details. 
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dividend change announcements that include 4,910 dividend increases and 448 dividend 
decreases.  Since the sample of dividend decreases is rather small for the tests that we 
conduct, we henceforth focus on dividend increases. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
The extent of institutional holdings is measured by INSTj, the proportion of shares 
outstanding owned by institutional investors in the firm that makes the dividend 
announcement j.  Table 5 presents the mean and median of the annual average of INSTj 
for firms that announce dividend increases, which are the focus of our analysis. The 
results show a clear trend of increase over time. The mean INSTj almost doubles between 
1980 and 1998 from 0.2901 to 0.5351, and the median INSTj increases in a similar way. 
Institutional holdings are larger for stocks with greater market capitalization (size). The 
average of Corr(INSTj ,SIZENj), calculated for each quarter across the stocks in our 
sample, is 0.44, statistically significant.  The positive correlation between INSTj and 
SIZENj is because of liquidity considerations and because of economies of scale in 
obtaining and processing information by institutions.  Since large-size stocks are more 
liquid, institutions can have larger holdings in large stocks since it is easier for these large 
investors to divest when needed.  And, for a given investment in information about a firm 
(and assuming that the cost of obtaining information increases less than proportionally 
with the firm’s size), a larger holding provides a greater gain from information since the 
institution uses the information for a larger-size investment.  
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3.2 The effect of institutional holding on price reaction to dividend announcements 
 Our hypothesis is that larger institutional holdings reduce the positive response of 
stock prices to dividend increase announcements.  This is demonstrated in Figure 3.  In 
each quarter, we allocate the stocks for which there is a dividend increase into three equal 
portfolios by their institutional holdings: low, medium and high INST.  We then calculate 
the CAR over days –11 to +1 for each portfolio. The results in Figure 3 are consistent 
with our hypothesis.  The CAR around dividend increase announcements is highest for 
stocks with low institutional holdings and lowest for stocks with high institutional 
holdings. The ratio of the highest to the lowest CAR is about 4 to 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
Next, we test the effect of INST on CAR after controlling for other firm 
characteristics – size and dividend yield.  We estimate the following model: 
CARj = α0 + a1DDIVYj + a2INSTj + a3SP500j + a4SIZENj  + a5LTYLDj 
 +∑
=
70
1n
a6nQTRnj  + ∑
=
56
1m
a7mINDmj +  ej .   (7) 
INSTj is the proportion of institutional holdings in the firm, measured at the end of the 
quarter that precedes the quarter when the dividend increase announcement is made. 
SP500j is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the stock is included in the S&P 500 index. 
QTRnj is a dummy variable that equals 1 if event j is in quarter n and zero otherwise, n = 
1, 2, … 70 (our data include 71 quarters).  INDmj is an industry dummy variable that 
equals 1 if announcement j is in a firm that is classified in industry m, using two-digit 
SIC, and zero otherwise (our data include firms from 57 industries).  The model is 
estimated for both CARj for days 0 to +1 and CAR13j for days –11 to +1. 
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Our hypothesis is tested by the coefficient a2.  We propose that the stock price 
reaction to dividend increase announcements, which is usually positive, is smaller in 
firms with large institutional holdings. This implies that a2 < 0.  The variable SP500j 
controls for the fact that high values of INSTj in S&P 500 stocks do not imply that these 
stocks obtain the same institutional attention as do other stocks with the same INSTj that 
are not included in the S&P 500 index.  This is because some institutional holdings in 
S&P 50017 represent passive investments that do not induce the collection and analysis of 
information about the firm.  Ideally, we would like to include in INSTj only the active 
institutional holdings and exclude the passive ones, but this is infeasible.  We therefore 
include in the model the dummy variable SP500j.18 We expect to obtain a3 > 0.  
The other variables are included as controls. We of course expect that a1 > 0 since 
greater dividend increase leads to a greater stock price reaction. SIZENj should have a 
negative effect, a4  < 0, since large-value stocks receive greater attention by more 
investors and analysts and more information is available about them. Therefore, less new 
information about the firm is conveyed by the dividend announcement.  The inclusion of 
SIZENj prevents confounding of the effect of size with the effect of institutional holdings, 
given that institutional holdings and firm size are positively correlated.  LTYLDj, the 
long-term dividend yield, is included as a control variable since it is observed to affect 
abnormal returns at dividend announcements (Christensen and Prabhala, 1995). 
                                                 
17  See Bushee and Noe (2000). 
18 We also examine an alternative specification of model (7) where the variable SP500j is replaced by  
INSTj SP500j. The interpretation of the coefficient here is similar: if a stock is included in the S&P 500 
index, then the effect of INSTj on CARj should be less negative, i.e., the coefficient of INSTj SP500j is 
positive. These are indeed the results that we obtain. 
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INSERT TABLE 6 
Our hypothesis that high institutional holdings reduce the dividend announcement 
effect on prices is strongly supported by the estimation results of model (7), presented in 
Table 6, Panel A.  The coefficient of INSTj, a2, is negative and significant for both CAR 
and CAR13.    By the time the dividend increase is announced, most of the information 
that it conveys is already included in the stock prices of firms with high institutional 
holdings. Also, a3 is positive and significant, as expected. 
Checking the robustness of our results on the effect of institutional holdings, we 
re-estimate model (7), replacing the variable INSTj by an ordinal measure of institutional 
holdings, ORDINSTj.  In each quarter, stocks with dividend increase announcements are 
ranked by their institutional holdings and divided into 10 groups. ORDINSTj is the group 
order, ORDINSTj= 1, 2, …, 10, with 10 being the group with the highest INSTj. Thus, 
ORDINSTj is insensitive to outliers and clustering of values of INSTj.  The results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained for INSTj.  When ORDINSTj replaces INSTj in 
model (7), its coefficient a2 is –0.0004 (t = 2.20) for CAR and a2 = –0.0013 (t = 3.17) for 
CAR13. The signs and statistical significance of the other variables remain unchanged. 
 The second test of our hypothesis examines the effect of institutional holdings on 
the dividend response coefficient, which measures the sensitivity of the price change to 
the magnitude of the dividend increase. We estimate the following model: 
 CARj = b0 + b1DDIVYj + b2DDIVYj⋅INSTj + b3DIVYj⋅SP500j + b4SIZENj  
+ b5LTYLDj +∑
=
70
1n
b6QTRnj  +∑
=
56
1m
b7INDmj + ej ,   (8) 
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By our hypothesis, institutional holdings should reduce the dividend response 
coefficient, i.e., b2 < 0.  Since we focus on active institutional holdings while some 
holdings of S&P 500 stocks are passive, we should obtain b3 > 0. 
The estimation results of model (8), presented in Table 6, Panel B, again support 
our hypothesis. We obtain that b2 is negative and significant for both CAR and CAR13.  
In addition, b3 is positive and significant for CAR and CAR13.  Model (8) is again re-
estimated replacing INSTj by the ordinal variable ORDINSTj = 1, 2, …10 where 10 is the 
group with the highest INSTj.  We then obtain that for CAR, b2 = –0.107 (t = 2.72) and for 
CAR13, b2 = –0.220 (t = 2.71).  We thus conclude that, as hypothesized, there is a smaller 
effect of dividend increase announcements on stock prices in firms with high institutional 
holdings. 
Another potential effect on the information content of dividends is the extent of 
coverage by analysts.  We re-estimate model (8), adding the product variable 
DDIVYj⋅ANALYSTSj, where ANALYSTSj is the number of analysts’ estimates in the 
consensus earnings estimate prior to the announcement of dividend change (in 
logarithms; the data source is I/B/E/S).  The sample size is reduced to 3377 events.  The 
coefficient of  DDIVYj⋅ANALYSTSj is 0.26 (t = 1.94).  Importantly, the coefficient of 
INSTj is negative, –2.86, with t = 3.90, highly significant. 
 
3.3 Institutional holdings and return volatility before dividend announcements 
The return volatility just before the dividend announcement reflects in part arrival 
of new private information about the upcoming event.  We propose that in firms with 
high institutional holdings, the information conveyed by the dividend news is already 
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incorporated in the stock price by the time of the announcement.   It follows that return 
volatility soon before the dividend announcement should be a decreasing function of 
institutional holdings. This is the hypothesis tested in this section. We estimate the 
following model: 
VOLDIVj = c0 + c1DDIVYj + c2INSTj + c3SP500j + c4SIZENj + c5LTYLDj  
+ c6LTVOLj+∑
=
70
1n
c7nQTRnj  +∑
=
56
1m
c8mINDmj + ej .   (9) 
VOLDIVj is the standard deviation of daily excess returns just before the dividend 
increase announcement, days –21 to –2, and LTVOLj is the long-term volatility, measured 
as the standard deviation of monthly excess return over months -1 to -24.  Model (9) 
estimates the effect of INSTj on stock return volatility before the dividend announcement, 
controlling for the stock’s normal volatility LTVOLj.  Thus, the estimated effect of INSTj 
on VOLDIVj in this model does not reflect the risk preference of institutional investors, 
which is measured by the covariance between INSTj and LTVOLj in the multiple 
regression. The model also includes as controls the variables SIZENj and LTYLDj, which 
are correlated with INSTj. 
   By our hypothesis that high institutional holdings reduce the asymmetry in 
information or new information just prior to the dividend announcement, we should 
obtain c2 < 0.  We also expect that c3 > 0 if there are passive institutional holdings of 
S&P 500 stocks. The estimation results of model (9), presented in Table 7, support our 
hypothesis: c2 is negative and significant.  In addition, c3 is positive and significant (by a 
one-tail test). 
 INSERT TABLE 7 
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These results help distinguish between two explanations of the negative effect of 
institutional holdings on the stock price reaction to dividend increase announcements.  
One explanation is the new information that would be conveyed by the dividend news is 
already incorporated into the stock price of firms with high institutional holdings by the 
time of the announcement. Another explanation is that if institutions monitor corporate 
managers, the disciplining role of dividends is smaller in firms with high institutional 
holdings.   Our findings on the negative relationship between institutional holdings and 
return volatility prior to dividend announcements is consistent with the first explanation, 
since return volatility reflects in part asymmetric information.   
  
3.4 Trading by institutional investors around dividend increase announcements 
 The results so far are consistent with the proposition that institutional investors 
obtain positive information about the firm well before the dividend increase is 
announced.  By the time of the announcement, this information is already incorporated in 
the stock price; hence the smaller price reaction to the news.  It follows that institutions 
may be trading on their favorable information well before it is made public.  We now test 
this hypothesis. 
Institutional investors that have early information about the good news that is 
conveyed by the dividend increase may want to increase their holdings in the firm before 
the information becomes public.  After the dividend announcement, they may either hold 
on to the stock, in which case they earn normal returns, or divest it and move on to 
another investment where they can exploit their advantageous information. Since nearly 
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all institutional investors cannot borrow,19 they must divest some investments if they 
wish to increase their holdings in other, more advantageous investments.  
Specifically, we therefore hypothesize the following.  Before the dividend 
increase announcement, institutional investors increase their holdings in the firms that 
will increase dividends. After the announcement, they either leave unchanged or reduce 
their holdings in these firms. We test this hypothesis by the following model: 
∆INSTj,q = d0 + d1INST j,0 + d2SP500j + d3SIZENj + d4LTYLDj + d5LTVOLj 
+∑
=
70
1n
d6nQTRnj  +∑
=
56
1m
d7mINDmj + ej ,   (10) 
∆INSTj,q is the net change in institutional holdings of stock j in quarter q, ∆INSTj,q = 
INSTj,q – INSTj,q-1.  We estimate the model separately for each of the quarters q = –2 to 
q = +1, where q = 0 is the quarter during which the dividend increase announcement is 
made. By our hypothesis we expect the following: 
(i) d1 > 0 for q = –2 and q = –1, during which the institutions increase their 
holdings in anticipation of good news about the firm, and  
(ii) d1 ≤ 0 for q = 0 and q = +1. After the dividend announcement, the institutional 
investors no longer have dividend-related information advantage. They either 
hold on to their investment, implying d1 = 0, or they divest and switch to other 
investments, in which case d1 < 0. 
The other variables are expected to have the following coefficients. The sign of 
the coefficient d2 of the S&P 500 dummy should be opposite the sign of d1, as before, 
because stocks included in this index have large institutional holdings that are passive 
(due to indexing), whereas our analysis pertains to active institutional investing. 
                                                 
19 There are regulatory constraints on the ability of most institutional investors to borrow or short sell. 
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The signs of the coefficient d3 of SIZENj before the dividend announcement 
should be the opposite of that of INSTj.  We observe in Table 3 and in Table 7 that in 
large firms dividend announcements are less informative.  Since large firms are followed 
by many investors and analysts, some dividend-related information may be incorporated 
in the stock price before the announcements. Therefore, in large firms institutional 
investors do not have as great an information advantage as they have in smaller firms, 
and they do not increase their holdings by as much as they do in smaller firms prior to the 
dividend increase announcement. The signs of the coefficient d5 of VOLj before the 
dividend announcements should be the same as that of d1 since institutional investors can 
best exploit their information advantage in firms with greater volatility, which reflects in 
part asymmetric information and uncertainty. 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 The estimation results of model (10), presented in Table 8, support our 
hypotheses. The coefficient d1 of INSTj is positive and highly significant in the two 
quarters before the dividend increase announcement, and it is negative and highly 
significant in the quarter of the announcement (recall that the holdings are recorded at the 
end of the quarter) and in the quarter that follows.  That is, institutional investors exploit 
the positive information that they have about the firm, which is conveyed in the dividend 
increase, well before the announcement.  They increase their holdings of the stock before 
the information is made public and divest after the announcement, when their dividend-
related information advantage disappears.  This effect is mitigated in part if the 
institutional investment is held passively in S&P 500 index investments, as reflected by 
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the opposite sign of the coefficient d2 of S&P500j. The coefficients of SIZENj and 
LTVOLj have the expected signs before the dividend announcement quarter. 
 
3.4 The effect of institutional holding on the firms’ dividend decisions 
 Our explanation of the phenomenon of the disappearing dividend is that it is due 
to the decline in the information content of dividend announcements, which we tie to the 
increase in investments by institutions.  Since dividends are costly, it is not worth raising 
them for the purpose of signaling information if they do not provide informational 
benefit.20  We then find that the information content of dividend announcements is lower 
in firms with institutional holdings. This completes our proposition that the disappearing 
dividend phenomenon is tied to the increase in institutional investments. 
It follows that firms with high institutional holdings should be less likely to raise 
dividend.  This is the hypothesis tested in this section. We test the effect of institutional 
holdings on the likelihood of dividend increase by estimating a model that follows 
Prabhala (1997) with an added variable, INSTj, which is the focus of our test: 
Lj = θ0 + θ1INSTj +θ2SP500j + θ3LTYLDj + θ4DIFYLDj + θ5SIZENj + θ6PRCj   
+ θ7LTVOLj +∑
=
3
1n
θ8nQTRnj  +∑
=
M
m 1
θ9mINDmj +  ej .  (11) 
Lj equals +1, 0 or –1 if the dividend announcement j is, respectively, an increase, no 
change or decrease compared to the dividend in the previous quarter.  DIFYLDj = STYLDj 
– LTYLDj is the difference between short term and long term dividend yield,21 where 
STYLD is the short-term dividend yield, the most recent quarterly dividend divided by the 
                                                 
20   There are other reasons, beyond signaling, for firms to raise dividends. For example, if a firm does not 
have profitable investment opportunities, it may distribute the excess cash it has to its shareholders. 
21 We eliminate 9 announcements, 0.06% of the sample, with DIFYLD > 20%. 
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stock price at the end of the month prior to the dividend announcement and multiplied by 
four (annualized).  PRCj is the stock price (in logarithm) at the end of the quarter before 
the dividend announcement.  Notably, this estimation uses all dividend announcements 
for which data on INSTj are available, including those with no change in dividends, which 
are by far the great majority of all dividend announcements. 
INSERT TABLE 9 
Our hypothesis is that θ1 < 0, that is, the likelihood of a dividend increase is 
smaller in firms with high institutional holding.  The results, presented in Table 9, 
support our hypothesis. The coefficient of INSTj is negative and significant.  This 
suggests that across firms, those with higher institutional holdings are less likely to raise 
dividends.  This suggests that in general, the dividend decision of firms is affected in part 
by the composition of their investors.  In particular, this finding is consistent with our 
hypothesis that the phenomenon of disappearing dividends are tied to the increase in 
institutional holdings of stocks. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 In this paper we propose the following. 
A. The “disappearing dividend” phenomenon is partly due to the decline in the 
information content of dividend announcements.  If dividends provide investors with 
less information about the firm’s value, then given that they are costly, firms may 
refrain from initiating them or from raising them and may even reduce them. 
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B. Dividend announcements are becoming less informative due to the increase in 
stockholding by institutional investors, who are more sophisticated and informed than 
average individual investors.  Thus, by the time the dividend news is announced, the 
information that it is intended to convey is already incorporated in the stock price. 
Consequently, the disappearing dividends are partly a result of the increase in 
institutional holdings. 
We test each of the two hypotheses in a number of ways and the results are 
consistent with our hypotheses.  By this analysis, the disappearance of dividends reflects 
the declining role of dividends as a means to convey information, which is a result of the 
increase in holdings by investors who are informed and sophisticated, such as 
institutional investors. 
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Table 1   
Statistics of two-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR, in events of dividend changes 
 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns for announcements of dividend 
increase and dividend decrease. The sample consists of NYSE\AMEX stocks for the 
years 1962-2000 and excludes all dividend changes that arise from stock dividends/splits, 
merger/acquisition, and other non-cash distributions that change shares outstanding, and 
dividend changes that are smaller than 0.5% in absolute value. There are 14,911 dividend 
increase announcements and 1,278 dividend decrease announcements. 
CAR is the two-day cumulative abnormal return, the sum of abnormal returns for days 0 
(the dividend announcement day) and day +1 relative to a return on a portfolio of the size 
decile to which the stock belongs. Tdif is the t-statistic that tests the difference between 
the mean in one period and the mean in the previous period. The numbers in parentheses 
under the mean CAR are t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the mean is different from 
zero. 
 
Dividend increases Dividend decreases Period 
Mean 
(t-stat.) 
Tdif Median N Mean 
(t-stat.) 
Tdif Median N 
1962-2000 0.87% 
(31.60) 
 0.58% 14911 -4.58% 
(-24.38) 
 -3.68% 1278
Three subperiods: 
1962-1974 1.17% 
(20.82) 
 0.81% 3934 -6.43% 
(-19.55) 
 -5.97% 416 
1975-1987 0.94% 
(23.05) 
-3.31 0.65% 7251 -4.29% 
(-15.33) 
-4.94 -3.55% 548 
1988-2000 0.44% 
(8.97) 
-7.85 0.23% 3726 -2.63% 
(-7.31) 
-3.64 -1.77% 314 
Eight subperiods: 
1962-1965 0.96% 
(10.75) 
 0.68% 1027 -5.26% 
(-8.08) 
 -4.99% 76 
1966-1970 1.13% 
(11.95) 
1.29 0.81% 1202 -6.82% 
(-13.63) 
1.91 -6.88% 175 
1971-1975 1.41% 
(15.92) 
2.19 0.97% 2147 -6.24% 
(-13.54) 
-0.86 -5.29% 239 
1976-1980 1.03% 
(18.92) 
-3.72 0.72% 4106 -5.00% 
(-9.48) 
-1.77 -3.76% 173 
1981-1985 0.68% 
(9.84) 
-3.90 0.44% 2088 -3.85% 
(-10.14) 
-1.77 -3.43% 251 
1986-1990 0.44% 
(6.42) 
-2.55 0.26% 1704 -2.73% 
(-4.49) 
-1.56 -2.38% 104 
1991-1995 0.49% 
(6.31) 
0.49 0.28% 1493 -2.75% 
(-5.10) 
0.02 -1.81% 151 
1996-2000 0.47% 
(4.65) 
-0.12 0.23% 1144 -2.19% 
(-3.59) 
-0.68 -1.49% 109 
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Table 2 
Statistics on cumulative abnormal returns that cover a period before the announcement of 
dividend 
 
CAR10 is the cumulative abnormal return over days –11 to –2 before the dividend 
announcement day, day 0. CAR13 is the cumulative abnormal return over days –11 to +1. 
Tdif is the t-statistic that tests the difference between the mean in one period and the 
mean in the previous period. The numbers in parentheses under the mean CAR are t-
statistics testing the hypothesis that the mean is different from zero. 
 
Dividend increases Dividend decreases 
CAR10 CAR13 CAR10 CAR13 
Period 
Mean 
(t-stat) 
Tdif Mean 
(t-stat) 
Tdif Mean 
(t-stat) 
Tdif Mean 
(t-stat) 
Tdif 
1962-2000 0.52% 
(10.84) 
 1.52% 
(27.88) 
 -1.42% 
(6.65) 
 -6.25% 
(21.97) 
 
Three subperiods: 
1962-1974 0.87% 
(9.16) 
 2.21% 
(20.64) 
 -1.71% 
(5.40) 
 -8.44% 
(19.23) 
 
1975-1987 0.48% 
(6.92) 
-3.37 1.56% 
(19.92) 
-4.91 -1.68% 
(5.21) 
-0.07 -6.14% 
(14.83) 
-3.80 
1988-2000 0.23% 
(2.47) 
-2.14 0.70% 
(6.67) 
-6.51 -0.60% 
(1.16) 
-1.79 -3.55% 
(5.35) 
-3.31 
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Table 3 
The dividend response coefficient over time 
 
Estimates the model across all events of dividend changes, indexed by j, 
CARj = α0 +∑
=
S
s 1
α0sDUMs  +∑
=
S
s 1
α1sDUMs⋅DDIVYj  + α1DDIVYj 
   + α2SIZENj + α3LTYLDj + ej  .     (3) 
CARj is the two-day abnormal return on days 0 (the dividend announcement day) and +1, 
relative to the return on a portfolio of the size decile to which the stock belongs.  DUMs 
has a value of 1 in period s and zero otherwise.  The index s is for time periods.  The 
dividend response coefficient is α1 and α1s measures the change in the coefficient in 
subperiod s. 
In Panel A, the sample is split into three equal subperiods of 13 years each, 1962-1974, 
1975-1987 and 1988-2000. Then, S = 2. In Panel B, the sample is split into 8 subperiods: 
1962-1965, 1966-1970, … 1991-1995. Then, S = 7.   
DDIVYj is the change in the dividend yield compared to the dividend yield in the quarter 
before the change. SIZENj is the stock capitalization normalized by the S&P 500 index.  
LTYLDj is the stock’s long-term yield in the year before the dividend announcement. The 
sample covers announcements of increases and decreases in quarterly dividends for 
NYSE\AMEX stocks during 1962-2000.  The t-statistics are in parentheses, calculated 
using White’s (1980) robust estimation of standard errors. 
 
Panel A: Three subperiods 
 
Coefficient 
Variable 
Dividend 
increases 
Dividend 
decreases 
α0 0.006 
(3.25) 
-0.016 
(1.71) 
α01, 1962-74 
DUM1 
-0.0006 
(0.46) 
-0.021 
(2.60) 
α02, 1975-87 
DUM2 
-0.0050 
(4.43) 
-0.0039 
(0.60) 
α11, 1962-74 
DUM1⋅DDIVYj 
0.75 
(2.52) 
0.67 
(2.10) 
α12, 1975-87 
DUM2⋅DDIVYj 
0.89 
(3.33) 
0.31 
(1.41) 
α1, 1988-2000 
DDIVYj 
0.76 
(3.30) 
0.21 
(1.14) 
α2 
SIZENj 
-0.0008 
(4.68) 
0.0009 
(0.75) 
α3 
LTYLDj 
0.14 
(7.89) 
-0.27 
(2.42) 
Adjust R2 6.3% 9.3% 
No. of Obs 14481 1204 
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Panel B: Eight subperiods 
 
Coefficient 
Variable 
Dividend 
increases 
Dividend 
decreases 
α0 0.007 
(3.76) 
-0.013 
(-0.96) 
α01 
DUM1 
-0.004 
(-1.30) 
0.005 
(0.34) 
α02 
DUM2 
-0.004 
(-1.80) 
-0.014 
(-0.97) 
α03 
DUM3  
-0.002 
(-1.32) 
-0.022 
(-2.01) 
α04 
DUM4 
-0.010 
(-5.94) 
0.005 
(0.41) 
α05 
DUM5 
-0.005 
(-3.19) 
-0.012 
(-1.14) 
α06 
DUM6 
-0.004 
(-2.32) 
-0.005 
(-0.46) 
α07 
DUM7 
-0.002 
(-2.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
α11, 1962-65 
DUM1⋅DDIVYj 
0.74 
(1.25) 
2.1 
(2.79) 
α12, 1966-70 
DUM2DDIVYj 
1.51 
(2.97) 
1.3 
(2.13) 
α13, 1971-75 
DUM3⋅DDIVYj 
1.20 
(2.74) 
0.4 
(0.87) 
α14, 1976-80 
DUM4⋅DDIVYj 
1.40 
(3.52) 
1.1 
(2.19) 
α15, 1981-85 
DUM5⋅DDIVYj 
0.92 
(2.12) 
0.0 
(-0.06) 
α16, 1986-90 
DUM6⋅DDIVYj 
0.66 
(1.39) 
-0.1 
(-0.33) 
α17, 1991-95 
DUM7⋅DDIVYj 
0.36 
(0.79) 
0.0 
(0.06) 
α1,  
DDIVYj 
0.43 
(1.17) 
0.2 
(0.65) 
α2 
SIZENj 
-0.0008 
(-4.60) 
0.0003 
(0.28) 
α3 
LTYLDj 
0.15 
(8.39) 
-0.22 
(-1.95) 
Adjust R2 6.6% 10.5% 
No. of Obs 14481 1204 
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Table 4 
The effect on return volatility before dividend announcements of changes in dividend 
yield over time 
 
Estimates the model across all events of dividend changes, indexed by j, 
VOLDIVj = α0 +∑
=
2
1s
α0sDUMs  +∑
=
2
1s
α1sDUMs⋅DDIVYj  + α1DDIVYj 
    + α2LTVOLj + ej  .      (6) 
VOLDIVj is the standard deviation of stock return over days -21 to -1 before the 
announcement of a change in dividend yield, and LTVOLj is the monthly return volatility 
of the stock over months -24 to -1, measuring long-term volatility (both are in 
logarithms).  DUMs has a value of 1 in period s and zero otherwise. The sample is split 
into three equal subperiods of 13 years each, and s = 1 is for 1962-1974 and s = 2 is for 
1975-1987.  
The sample covers announcements of increases and decreases in quarterly dividends for 
NYSE\AMEX stocks during 1962-2000.  The t-statistics are in parentheses, calculated 
using White’s (1980) robust estimation of standard errors. 
 
 
Dividend 
increases 
Dividend 
decreases 
α0 -2.66 
(104.39) 
-2.36 
(24.72) 
α01 
DUM1 
0.0002 
(0.02) 
-0.15 
(2.60) 
α02 
DUM2 
-0.042 
(3.79) 
-0.17 
(3.71) 
α11 
DUM1⋅DDIVYj 
13.81 
(5.63) 
-4.60 
(2.31) 
α12 
DUM2⋅DDIVYj 
7.92 
(3.35) 
-1.74 
(1.46) 
α1 
DDIVYj 
-0.75 
(0.35) 
-1.92 
(2.32) 
α2 
LTVOLj 
0.60 
(65.49) 
0.63 
(17.69) 
Adjust R2 0.26 0.24 
No. of Obs 14748 1260 
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Table 5 
Statistics on institutional holdings over time 
 
The table presents statistics on INST, the proportion of the firm’s stock held by 
institutional investors.  The observations are for firms that announce dividend increase. 
The variable INST is for the end of the quarter when dividend increase is announced. 
Data are missing for three quarters, 4Q1993-2Q1994. The averages for the respective 
years are over the quarters for which data are available. 
 
 
INST 
Year 
Number of 
cases Mean Median 
1980 283 0.2901 0.2946 
1981 373 0.3150 0.3320 
1982 265 0.3215 0.3366 
1983 259 0.3403 0.3575 
1984 335 0.3567 0.3713 
1985 264 0.3918 0.4025 
1986 198 0.4264 0.4350 
1987 253 0.4365 0.4514 
1988 326 0.4601 0.4807 
1989 315 0.4603 0.4754 
1990 261 0.4836 0.5006 
1991 203 0.4825 0.4909 
1992 228 0.4823 0.5091 
1993 195 0.4885 0.5296 
1994 156 0.4983 0.5063 
1995 323 0.5104 0.5453 
1996 309 0.4934 0.5075 
1997 231 0.5131 0.5264 
1998 130 0.5351 0.5447 
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Table 6   
The effect of institutional holdings on stock price reaction to dividend increases 
 
In the following models, CARj is the two-day abnormal return on days 0 (the dividend 
announcement day) and +1, relative to the return on a portfolio of the size decile to which 
the stock belongs. CAR13j is the cumulative abnormal return over days –11 to +1. 
DDIVYj is the increase in dividend yield of firm j, INSTj is institutional holding as a 
fraction of firm’s j outstanding shares as of the end of the quarter prior to the dividend 
announcement, SP500j is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j is included in the S&P 
500 index, SIZENj is the firm size deflated by the S&P 500 index (the base is 1962), 
LTYLDj is the firm’s long-term yield in the year before the dividend announcement. 
QTRnj is a quarter dummy variable and INDmj is an industry dummy variable (there are 71 
quarters and 57 industries in the sample). 
 
 
Panel A. 
 
CARj = a0 + a1DDIVYj + a2INSTj + a3SP500j + a4SIZENj + a5LTYLDj  
+∑
=
70
1n
a6nQTRnj  + ∑
=
56
1m
a7mINDmj + ej .    (7) 
 
 
Variable 
CAR CAR13
a1 
DDIVYj 
1.03 
(7.60) 
1.76 
(6.27) 
a2 
INSTj 
-0.007
(2.28) 
-0.019 
(3.06) 
a3 
SP500j  
0.003 
(2.15) 
0.007 
(2.46) 
a4 
SIZENj  
-0.001
(3.38) 
-0.003 
(3.15) 
a5 
LTYLDj  
0.12 
(3.42) 
0.29 
(3.98) 
Adjust R2 
8.9% 7.2% 
No. of Obs
4507 4507 
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Panel B. 
 
CARj = b0 + b1DDIVYj + b2DDIVYj⋅INSTj + b3DDIVYj⋅SP500j + b4SIZENj  
+ b5LTYLDj +∑
=
70
1n
b6nQTRnj  +∑
=
56
1m
b7mINDmj + ej ,   (8) 
 
Variable CAR CAR13
b1 
DDIVYj 
1.41 
(7.41) 
2.49 
(6.34) 
b2 
DDIVYj⋅ INSTj 
-1.79 
(3.23) 
-3.41 
(2.98) 
b3 
DDIVYj⋅ SP500j 
0.74 
(2.76) 
1.52 
(2.74) 
b4 
SIZENj  
-0.001
(3.91) 
-0.003 
(3.81) 
b5 
LTYLDj  
0.12 
(3.22) 
0.28 
(3.79) 
Adjust R2 7.3% 7.2% 
No. of Obs 4507 4507 
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Table 7 
Stock volatility and institutional holdings 
 
 
VOLDIVj = c0 + c1DDIVYj + c2INSTj + c3SP500j + c4SIZENj + c5LTYLDj  
+ c6LTOLj+∑
=
N
n 1
 c7nDQnj  +∑
=
M
m 1
c8mINDmj + ej ,   (9) 
 
Where VOLDIVj is the standard deviation of daily returns from day –21 to day –2 (day 0 
is the dividend announcement day), and LTVOLj is the standard deviation of the monthly 
returns from month –24 to month –1. (Both volatility measures are in logarithm.) DDIVYj 
is the increase in dividend yield of firm j compared to the previous quarter, INSTj is the 
institutional holding as a fraction of firm’s j outstanding shares as of the end of the 
quarter prior to the quarter of the dividend increase announcement, SP500j is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if firm j is included in the S&P 500 index, SIZENj is the firm size 
deflated by the S&P 500 index (the base is 1962), LTYLDj is the firm’s long-term yield in 
the year before the dividend announcement. QTRnj and INDmj are, respectively, a quarter 
and an industry dummy variable (there are 71 quarters and 57 industries in the sample). 
 
 
Variable Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
c1 
DDIVYj 
4.34 
(2.78) 
c2 
INSTj 
-0.11 
(3.25) 
c3 
SP500j 
0.028 
(1.92) 
c4 
SIZENj 
-0.007 
(1.37) 
c5 
LTYLDj 
-1.90 
(4.50) 
c6 
LTVOLj 
0.50 
(23.32) 
Adjust R2 33.1% 
No. of obs 4507 
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Table 8 
Institutional trading surrounding dividend announcements 
 
∆INSTj,q = d0 + d1INSTj,0 + d2SP500j + d3SIZENj + d4LTYLDj + d5LTVOLj 
+∑
=
70
1n
d6nQTRnj  +∑
=
56
1m
d7mINDmj + ej .    (10) 
The model is estimated for each of the quarters q = -2 to q = +1 where q = 0 is the quarter 
during which the dividend increase is announced. INSTj,0 is the institutional holding as a 
fraction of firm’s j outstanding shares at the end of quarter q = 0. ∆INSTj,q = INSTj,q− 
INSTj,q-1.  SP500j is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stock j is included in the S&P 500 
index, SIZENj is the firm size deflated by the S&P 500 index (the base is 1962), LTYLDj 
is the firm’s long-term yield over the year before the dividend announcement, LTVOLj is 
the standard deviation of the monthly returns from month –24 to month –1. QTRnj is a 
quarter dummy variable and INDmj is an industry dummy variable (there are 71 quarters 
and 57 industries in the sample). 
 
 
 Dependent Variables: changes in institutional holdings 
 q = –2 q = –1 q =  0 q = +1 
d1 
INSTj,0 
0.02 
(6.34) 
0.03 
(8.09) 
-0.01 
(3.93) 
-0.01 
(4.21) 
d2 
SP500j 
-0.0012 
(1.03) 
-0.0041 
(3.03) 
0.0016 
(1.18) 
0.0008 
(0.59) 
d3 
SIZENj  
-0.0011 
(2.6) 
-0.0014 
(3.16) 
-0.0001 
(0.29) 
-0.0003 
(0.69) 
d4 
LTYLDj  
0.07 
(1.96) 
0.03 
(0.67) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.02 
(0.47) 
d5 
LTVOLj  
0.0054 
(3.04) 
0.0045 
(2.27) 
0.0003 
(0.14) 
0.0009 
(0.45) 
R2 6.29% 7.26% 4.57% 5.49% 
No. of Obs 4261 4262 4267 4269 
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Table 9 
The determinants of the likelihood of dividend changes 
 
Lj = θ0 + θ1INSTj +θ2SP500j + θ3LTYLDj + θ4DIFYLDj + θ5SIZENj  
+ θ6PRCj  + θ7LTVOLj +∑
=
70
1n
θ8nQTRnj  +∑
=
56
1m
θ9mINDmj +  ej . (11) 
 
Lj equals +1, 0 or –1 if the dividend announcement for company j is, respectively, an 
increase, no change or decrease in dividend compared to the dividend in the previous 
quarter.  INSTj is the institutional holding as a fraction of the outstanding shares of firm’s 
j as of the end of the quarter when the dividend announcement is made.  SP500j is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j is included in the S&P 500 index.  LTYLDj is the 
firm’s long-term yield over the year before the dividend announcement, DIFYLDj is the 
difference between the dividend yield of the last quarter before the dividend 
announcement and the long-term yield. SIZENj is the firm size deflated by the S&P 500 
index (the base is 1962). PRCj is the stock price (in logarithm) at the end of the quarter 
before the dividend announcement.  LTVOLj is the standard deviation of the monthly 
returns from month –24 to month –1. QTRnj is a quarter dummy variable and INDmj is an 
industry dummy variable (there are 71 quarters and 57 industries in the sample). 
 
Parameter Coefficient 
θ1 
INSTj  
-0.15 
(3.01) 
θ2 
SP500j  
-0.03 
(1.60) 
θ3 
 LTYLDj 
-10.56 
(19.15) 
θ4 
 DIFYLDj 
-31.22 
(48.28) 
θ5 
 SIZENj 
0.07 
(8.52) 
θ6 
 PRCj 
0.13 
(7.23) 
θ7 
 LTVOLj 
-0.19 
(6.62) 
No. of Obs 44160 
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Figure 1 
The pattern of CARy over time for dividend increases and decreases. 
 
CARy is the yearly average of two-day cumulative abnormal return, days 0 and +1 (day 0 
is the dividend announcement day).  There are two figures, one for dividend increases 
and one for dividend decreases.  
The solid line depicts CARy for the year. The dashed line is the five-year moving average. 
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Figure 2 
The pattern of the dividend response coefficient over time for dividend increases 
 
The figure plots the dividend response coefficient, α1, from the regression model   
CARj = α0 + α1DDIVYj + α2SIZENj + α3LTYLDj + ej  .   (2) 
The model is estimated for each year across all dividend increase announcements during 
the year. CARj is the two-day cumulative abnormal return, days 0 and +1 (day 0 is the 
dividend announcement day). DDIVYj is the change in the dividend yield compared to the 
dividend yield in the quarter before the change. SIZENj is the stock capitalization 
normalized by the S&P 500 index.  LTYLDj is the stock’s long-term yield, in the year 
before the dividend announcement. 
The solid line depicts the estimated α1 for the year. The dashed line is the five-year 
moving average. 
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Figure 3 
Institutional holdings and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), day –11 to day +1 
 
The CARs are averaged for three portfolios: high, medium and low institutional holdings. 
Stocks for which there is a dividend increase announcement in a quarter are allocated into 
one of the three portfolios according to the institutional holding of the stock.  
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